ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
amount of money for each day identified critical work is completed ahead of schedule and assesses a deduction for each day the contractor overruns the incentive/disincentive time."
Previous Survey-Based Evaluations

150
In terms of survey-based methods for evaluating I/D contracts, NCHRP 652 obtained surveys 151 from thirty-two states and in-depth investigations of six states (Fick et al. 2010) . In terms of 152 safety, the authors discussed the significant challenges that exist in evaluating the safety impacts 153 of I/D contracts. The authors even stated that in their judgment, it was nearly impossible to 154 conduct a safety comparison between contracts that incorporate acceleration clauses and those 155 that do not. And no one interviewed was aware of any attempt to conduct such an analysis. And 156 the chapter entitled, "Evaluating I/D Effectiveness", only discussed the need for adequate metrics (Strong 2005) . Gillespie (1998) suggests that acceleration provisions, especially when combined 162 with A+B bidding, tend to produce more innovative bids from contractors in order to compete in 163 the bidding market and have the opportunity to earn the maximum incentive. A drawback to I/D 164 provisions is that bid prices could rise due to the increased risk transferred to the contractor. As
165
shown by Arditi et al. (1997) , most I/D projects pay incentives, and the final cost of the project 166 could be unnecessarily high if a completion date is too generous.
167
Some studies examined a broad range of techniques for construction and acceleration, 
RESULTS
302
For each of the twenty I/D projects used in this analysis, the RUC were calculated separately as 303 shown in Table 2 . The RUC savings from the 20 I/D projects benefitted the traveling public 304 favorably. For a contractor to start earning incentives, the work zone must be reopened to traffic. Table   339 3, all of the projects combined netted 81% of RUC with a target of 80% (calculated from Table   340 2). Also, the rural, non-emergency projects reduced the fewest number of target days. The lower 341 performance was partly due to the low average daily RUC of $18,786. Presumably because of 342 this, the incentives were set closer to the actual RUC to motivate the contractor to accelerate 343 construction. Proportionally, even at the target number of days, rural, non-emergency contracts paid the most incentives compared to the RUC savings. The fact that only 23% of the target RUC 345 savings was realized indicates that rural projects may not be the most suitable for I/D provisions.
346
< Insert Table 3 here>   347 The nine urban projects reduced 16 more days than the target. This is the result of four of 348 the contracts finishing earlier than the maximum incentive day. Interestingly, these extra days 349 did not result in total RUC savings higher than the total target RUC savings. This is due to 350 projects, which did not finish beyond the target, having a greater influence on the RUC savings.
351
The project with the highest RUC ($104,134/day) only reduced 3 of 14 possible days.
352
Altogether, the urban projects netted 80% of the RUC saved which was the same as the target at appropriate values, balancing the contractor's ability to accelerate construction and the 363 agency's desire to minimize RUC.
364
The five emergency projects are the only subcategory to save more RUC than the target 365 value. This occurred even though only 82% of the target days were reduced. Two projects that will be possible to set and achieve goals based on the motivations behind using I/D contracts.
381
The data for the overall MoDOT construction program was obtained from the Tracker,
382
while the I/D project data was computed using the data described in previous sections. The 
386
The necessity for a project to stay on budget is becoming increasingly important as 387 funding for transportation struggles to meet demand. Early in the development of a project,
388
program costs are estimated, which become the project's budget according to MoDOT (2012) .
389
The Tracker reports the programmed project cost as compared to the final project cost to be 0%. would result in higher bids from contractors due to more risk transferred to the contractor.
401
The ability of a project to stay on schedule is another important measure of performance. 
